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Abstract 
 
This essay examines the use of GPS surveillance in enforcing domestic 
violence protection orders.  Part I explores the rationale for using GPS 
surveillance in domestic violence situations.  Part II addresses the primary 
constitutional concerns associated with GPS monitoring in the domestic 
violence context.  Finally, Part III examines the effectiveness of GPS 
surveillance in domestic violence cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On Valentine’s Day 2009, Tiana Notice frantically called 911, 
exclaiming that her “ex-boyfriend just stabbed [her] to death.”1  James Carter 
Jr. stabbed Tiana at least 18 times on the deck of her apartment.2  In addition 
to murder, Carter was charged with violating a protective order issued against 
him on behalf of Tiana.3  Tiana’s story is not unique; many domestic abusers 
have violated protective orders and subsequently murdered their former 
partners.4 
Due in part to tragic deaths like Tiana’s,, global position monitoring 
system (GPS) surveillance is becoming more common tool to track in 
domestic violence cases.5  GPS surveillance is a necessary and effective tool 
for law enforcement personnel to protect victims of domestic violence.  Part I 
of this essay explores the rationale for using this service to combat domestic 
                                                        
1
 Christine Dempsey, Jury Hears 911 Call from Tiana Notice, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 14, 
2011, http://articles.courant.com/2011-10-14/news/hc-carter-notice-trial-1015-
20111014_1_pt-cruiser-tiana-notice-alvin-notice. 
2
 Id.; Christine Dempsey, Carter Said He Stabbed Tiana Notice, Defendant’s Brother Testifies, 
HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 18, 2011, http://articles.courant.com/2011-10-18/news/hc-carter-
notice-1019-20111018_1_james-carter-tiana-notice-brandon-carter. 
3
 Dempsey, Carter Said He Stabbed Tiana Notice, Defendant’s Brother Testifies, supra note 2, 
at 2.  
4
 See generally Liam Ford, Global Eye to be Kept on Abusers, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 5, 2008, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-domestic-violence-080805,0,4035794.story 
(discussing the death of Cindy Bischof, who was murdered by her ex-boyfriend); Ronnie Ellis, 
Steve Nunn Served with EPO, Put on Administrative Leave, NEWS & TRIB., Feb. 25, 2009,  
http://newsandtribune.com/archive/x518756620/Steve-Nunn-served-with-EPO-put-on-
administrative-leave (discussing the death of Amanda Ross, who was shot to death by her 
former fiancé). 
5
 Shelley M. Santry, Can You Find Me Now?, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1101, 1102 (2011).  For 
an overview of the development of GPS technology and the various devices used by law 
enforcement personnel, see Ian Herbert, Where We Are With Location Tracking: A Look at 
the Current Technology and the Implications on Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 442, 466-488 (2011). See also EDNA EREZ ET AL., GPS MONITORING 
TECHNOLOGIES AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: AN EVALUATION STUDY x (2012), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238910.pdf (“Since 2000, twenty-one states and the 
District of Columbia have enacted legislation mandating or recommending that justice 
agencies employ GPS to protect victims of DV during the pretrial period; several other states 
are in the process of considering such legislation”).   
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violence.  Part II addresses the primary constitutional arguments against the 
government’s use of such technology.  Finally, Part III discusses its overall 
effectiveness. 
PART I:  THE NECESSITY OF GPS MONITORING IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
CASES 
All three women had had restraining orders against the men 
who finally killed them, legal papers saying that the men had to 
keep away. Maybe they were the last three women in New 
York to know what all emergency-room nurses know, and cops’ 
wives know, too: that restraining orders are a joke, made, as 
they say, to be broken.6 
In the best-selling novel Black and Blue, renowned author Anna 
Quindlen decries the perceived ineffectiveness of protection orders in 
domestic violence cases.7 The evidence suggests, however, that, most of the 
time, protection orders lessen instances of abuse.  As one author notes, 
“[r]eports indicate some 86% of the women who received a protection order 
state the abuse either stopped or was greatly reduced.”8 
As evidenced by this statistic, a civil protection order can be a valuable 
tool for a domestic abuse victim to use against an abuser.  A restraining order 
works to prevent future abuse by prohibiting the abuser to from contacting the 
                                                        
6
 ANNA QUINDLEN, BLACK AND BLUE 78 (1998). 
7
 Id. Anna Quindlen is the author of three best-selling novels, one of which is Black and Blue. 
Black and Blue tells the story a woman who has been subject to years of abuse at the hands of 
her husband.  
8
 See Domestic Violence Statistics, A.B.A., available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/domestic_violence/resources/statistics.html (citing James 
Ptacek, Battered Women in the Courtroom: The Power of Judicial Response (1999)) (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2012) (“Reports indicate some 86% of the women who received a protection 
order state the abuse either stopped or was greatly reduced.”). But see Mary Ann Scholl, GPS 
Monitoring May Cause Orwell to Turn in his Grave, But Will it Escape Constitutional 
Challenges? A Look at GPS Monitoring of Domestic Violence Offenders in Illinois, 43 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 845, 845-50 (2010) (noting that “[t]hree women are killed each day by an 
intimate partner, many of whom are known to have had orders of protection. . . . the 
[protection] order is often, in effect, nothing more than a piece of paper”).  
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victim; if the abuser resides with the victim, the abuser must relocate.9  As 
such, a protective order also serves to re-establish the independence of the 
victim.10 
Despite its benefits, a civil protective order in a domestic violence case 
can be particularly difficult to enforce, given the intimate relationship between 
both parties.11  The abuser is familiar with the victim’s usual daily routine and 
social habits, and knows her friends and family.12  This knowledge provides 
the abuser with several opportunities to harass or abuse the victim and thereby 
violate the protection order.13 The rationale behind GPS surveillance is to curb 
these violations by eliminating the abuser’s ability to commit them without 
detection.14  As one judge noted:  
[The GPS program] drives the message home to the offender 
that there is to be no contact, that the no-contact order is going 
to be supervised and that there are repercussions if there is any 
contact. Likewise, I think it gives the victim some added sense 
of security. It puts some teeth into an oral order: ‘stay away 
and have no contact’. You can tell somebody that, but if you 
actually have a device or system in place that's really going to 
measure it and make sure that there isn't contact, that helps 
across the board. It enhances a temporary protection order; it 
puts some teeth into it.15 
 
 
 
                                                        
9
 Edna Erez et al., Electronic Monitoring of Domestic Violence Cases – A Study of Two 
Bilateral Programs, 68-JUN Fed. Probation 15, 16 (2004).  
10
 See Santry, supra note 5, at 1106 n.40 (noting that civil protection orders “advance the 
autonomy and independence of the battered woman from the abuser”).  
11
 See Erez et al., supra note 9, at 16. 
12
 Id.  
13
 Id. 
14
 Id.  
15
 Id. 
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PART II:  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GPS MONITORING 
A.  Fourth Amendment Concerns 
The “search and seizure” provision of the Fourth Amendment presents 
the primary constitutional hurdles to GPS monitoring of alleged domestic 
violence perpetrators.  The Fourth Amendment provides, specifically, that 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated” by 
the government.16  The government’s use of a tracking device to monitor the 
actions of a citizen implicates the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
privacy violations without consent or due process.17 
One possible response to this argument is that the alleged abuser did, 
in fact, consent to GPS surveillance.18  Upon violating a protective order, the 
alleged abuser has two options for punishment: incarceration or GPS 
monitoring.19  The alleged abuser that chooses GPS monitoring impliedly 
consents to the intrusive nature of electronic surveillance.20  Under established 
Fourth Amendment law, an individual that consents to a search and seizure 
cannot later claim that it was unreasonable.21 
Barring the consent argument, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
focused on the two-part “reasonable expectation of privacy” test articulated by 
Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States.22  The constitutionality of a Fourth 
Amendment search depends first on the subjective expectation of privacy.23  
Upon finding that the individual did have a subjective expectation of privacy, 
                                                        
16
 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
17
 Santry, supra note 5, at 1113.  See also Scholl, supra note 8, at 856 (“[O]ne constitutional 
concern is whether electronic monitoring invades the privacy rights of offenders because one 
can reasonably expect to have privacy in one’s own movements and whereabouts.”). 
18
 Scholl, supra note 8, at 856. 
19
 Id. 
20
 Id. 
21
 See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
22
 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Santry, supra note 5, at 1110-11. 
23
 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
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the court then asks whether this subjective expectation of privacy is one that 
society considers objectively “reasonable.”24 
Until recently, the Supreme Court had not, however, directly addressed 
the constitutional applicability of these Fourth Amendment principles to GPS 
monitoring.25  In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court held that attaching 
a GPS monitor to a car and subsequently using it to observe the car’s 
movements on public roads constituted a Fourth Amendment “search.”26 
Jones, however, distinguished the rationale of Katz, which asserts that the 
Fourth Amendment “right of the people to be secure in their persons” follows 
the individuals and is not limited to a physical “place.” Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion, instead, relied on the “trespassory theory of searches,” 
which focuses on the property rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.27  
Scalia did not consider whether the defendant possessed a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his conduct.28 
According to the majority, the use of GPS monitoring constituted a 
“search” because law enforcement personnel “physically occupied private 
property for the purpose of obtaining information.”29  Again, the Supreme 
Court did not address whether the search was reasonable, as the government 
failed to raise it at the appellate court level.30 This property-based analysis 
establishes a “minimum” degree of constitutional protections but provides 
little guidance in the context of electronic, non-physical monitoring of alleged 
abusers.31  In fact, as the Court noted in Jones, “[s]ituations involving merely 
the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to 
                                                        
24
 Id. 
25
 See U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
26
 Id. at 949. 
27
 Matthew Radler, Privacy is the Problem: United States v. Maynard and a Case for a New 
Regulatory Model for Police Surveillance, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1209, 1226- (2012).  
28
 Id.; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950. (“But we need not address the Government’s contentions [that 
Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy], because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights 
do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”) 
29
 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
30
 Id. at 954. 
31
 See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“In cases of electronic or other novel modes of 
surveillance that do not depend upon the physical invasion on property, the majority opinion’s 
trespassory test may provide little guidance.”). 
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Katz analysis.”32 Katz privacy analysis establishes that the Fourth Amendment 
protections “the right of the people to be secure in their persons,” Jones 
focuses on the property protections provided by the Fourth Amendment.33 
The constitutionality of GPS surveillance depends on whether GPS 
surveillance amounts to just electronic signals or the “physical[] occup[ation] 
of private property?”34 As an individual cannot be trespassed upon, it appears 
that the Katz analysis would still apply.35 Such an analysis would be simple if 
the law enforcement personnel used only a “reverse tagging” GPS 
surveillance system.36  “Reverse tagging” is a GPS technology that records 
data only if the alleged abuser enters a location prohibited by the protection 
order.37  Reverse tagging does not constantly monitor the alleged abuser’s 
whereabouts; rather, it only recognizes the victim when in the areas forbidden 
by the protection order.38  With reverse tagging, law enforcement personnel 
and the victim can protect against violations of the protection order, but the 
alleged abuser’s location is unknown when he is not in violation of the 
order.39 Under such circumstances, an individual could not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy when he is unlawfully present in an area,40 and GPS 
monitoring would, thus, not violate Fourth Amendment rights against 
unreasonable search and seizure. Constant GPS monitoring, or a GPS system 
                                                        
32
 Id. at 953. 
33
 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; id. at 949. 
34
 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
35
 See id. at 955; see also supra text accompanying note 35. 
36
 See Scholl, supra note 8, at 857.  
37
 See Leah Satine, Maximal Safety, Minimal Intrusion: Monitoring Civil Protective Orders 
Without Implicating Privacy, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 267, 268 (2008).  When “reverse 
tagging” is used “[t]he batterer wears only the signal receiving component of the GPS device, 
while the monitoring unit, which reads the location data captured by the signal receiver, is 
placed with the endangered woman. Preferably, multiple monitoring units are used, one that 
the woman wears on her person and others that are placed in each of the woman's liberty 
zones. The monitoring units read location information from a distance. The signal receiver 
could be designed so that the distances at which information is read correspond with, but do 
not exceed, the bounds of the liberty zones designated by the civil protective order.”  Id. 
38
 Id.  
39
 Id.   
40
 Santry, supra note 5, at 1113-14 & n.101 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 
(2005) for the notion that “there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in illegal activity”).  
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transmits data regardless of the alleged abuser’s location relative to a 
forbidden zone, however, may be too invasive under the Katz analysis.41 
Even if deemed a physical trespass, Jones demands inquiry of whether 
the trespass is intended to gather information.42  In Jones, FBI agents used 
GPS to monitor the car’s movements over 28 days for the purpose of 
investigating whether the defendant was trafficking drugs.43  The sole purpose 
of the GPS surveillance was to gather evidence to be used in a prosecution.44  
In a domestic violence case, the primary purpose of the GPS monitor is to 
protect the victim by deterring the alleged abuser from contacting the victim, 
not to gather evidence for an ongoing criminal investigation.   
B.  Equal Protection Concerns 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that 
“[n]o State . . . shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”45 In light of this amendment, GPS surveillance 
presents some equal protection concerns for indigent offenders and minorities. 
1. Indigent offenders 
In Griffin v. Illinois, the Supreme Court concluded that a “State can no 
more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or 
color.”46 Many state statutes require that the alleged abuser pay for all or a 
portion of the GPS surveillance cost,47 a policy that implicates the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for indigent individuals.48 
Law enforcement may avoid this equal protection challenge by implementing 
                                                        
41
 Scholl, supra note 8, at 857. 
42
 See id.  
43
 Id. at 948. 
44
 Id.  
45
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
46
 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956). 
47
 ANN H. CROWE ET AL., OFFENDER SUPERVISION WITH ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY 20 (2002), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/197102.pdf (“[A]t least 26 states 
require the offender to pay a portion of the costs involved; however, none of these states 
exclude offenders who are unable to pay from participating in the program.”).   
48
 Id. at 47 (“[W]hile it is acceptable to charge offenders a fee for use of electronic supervision 
technologies, programs should not disqualify offenders from the program solely because of 
their inability to pay a fee. To do so would be discriminatory.”). 
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a sliding scale fee.49  In fact, Kentucky utilizes a sliding scale fee that 
determines the amount the alleged abuser must pay based upon where he falls 
within the current Federal Poverty Guidelines.50  Alternatively, the state could 
require that an alleged abuser perform community service instead of requiring 
him to pay GPS program costs51 or simply incur the costs of electronic 
monitoring.52 
2. African-American Men 
 Another equal protection concern is that GPS monitoring could 
disproportionately affect African-American abusers.53  Some state courts, 
influenced by the stereotype of African-American men as aggressive and 
violent, may be more likely to enforce GPS surveillance on that particular 
group.54  Additionally, the tendency of officials to identify Black men as more 
likely to engage in other illegal activities55 may become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy if the GPS implicates the accused in another crime.  A state 
legislature should ensure that its domestic violence GPS monitoring policy 
does not result in a discriminatory impact against African-Americans, 
particularly men.56 
                                                        
49
 Id. 
50
 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.761(9)(b) (West 2010) provides: “If the court determines that a 
respondent is indigent, the court may, based on a sliding scale established by the Supreme 
Court of Kentucky by rule, require the respondent to pay the costs imposed under this section 
in an amount that is less than the full amount of the costs associated with operating the global 
positioning monitoring system in relation to the respondent or providing the petitioner with an 
electronic receptor device.”  See also Santry, supra note 5, at 1115-16 & n.116. 
51
 CROWE ET AL., supra note 47, at 47. 
52
 In fact, a recently amended California statute authorizing GPS surveillance states that “[i]f 
the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic 
monitoring, the court may order the electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local 
government that adopted the policy authorizing electronic monitoring.”  See 2012 Cal. Legis. 
Serv. Ch. 513 (A.B. 2467) (WEST) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.2 (West 2010).  
53
 See generally Alanna Buchanan, A Racial Justice Perspective on Monitoring Domestic 
Violence Offenders Using GPS Systems, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271 (2008). 
54
 Id. at 271-72. 
55
 Id. at 271. 
56
 Id. at 273. (“[A] policy that includes a GPS system must be designed to minimize racially 
disparate impact before being enacted or enforced.”). 
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C.  Procedural Due Process Concerns 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the government must adhere to 
certain procedures before depriving an individual of his or her freedom.57  In 
the domestic violence context, a GPS surveillance program could be subject to 
a procedural due process challenge if it fails to weigh the risk each individual 
abuser poses to the victim and the community.58 In response to this concern, 
many statutes provide for an individualized determination of whether GPS 
monitoring is appropriate.59  Such a statute should tailor the system to “the 
identity of the wearer and the area where the wearer is tracked.”60  Law 
enforcement personnel can employ a “uniform dangerousness assessment 
protocol” to determine the danger the alleged abuser poses to the victim.61 
D.  Court Decisions 
Despite these constitutional issues, courts have decided relatively few 
cases concerning the use of GPS in the domestic violence context.  Recently, a 
California appellate court addressed this issue in People v. Holiday.62  This 
case concerned defendant Ezell Holiday’s separation from his wife, B.H., 
following two abusive episodes.63 Among the charges in the felony complaint 
                                                        
57
 CROWE ET AL., supra note 47, at 22. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1. (“[N]or shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .”). 
58
 Scholl, supra note 8, at 860; Santry, supra note 5, at 1114-15. 
59
 Scholl, supra note 8, at 860-61.  
60
 See Zoila Hinson, GPS Monitoring and Constitutional Rights, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
285, 285 (2008). 
61
 See id. at 286. (“Section 1 of the [Massachusetts] statute requires the executive office of 
public safety to adopt a ‘uniform dangerousness assessment protocol’ to determine which 
abusers are most likely to injure their domestic partners and thus to decide who should be 
fitted with a GPS tracking device.”). 
62
 People v. Holiday, 2012 WL 1015787 (Cal. App. 2012). 
63
 In February of 2010, Holiday attacked B.H. in their home.  Id. at *1.  Specifically, Holiday 
pushed her onto a bed and then attempted to choke her.  Id.  Once B.H. tried to leave, Holiday 
pulled a knife on her and told her she was not permitted to leave the house.  Id. 
The next episode occurred two months later.  Id.  Holiday had moved out of their home and 
B.H.’s boyfriend had moved in.  Id.  On April 17th, Holiday waited outside the home and 
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filed against Holiday were “corporal injury on a spouse, while personally 
using a deadly weapon and causing great bodily injury . . . and assault while 
personally using a deadly weapon.”64   
Holiday entered a guilty plea on the felony assault charge, and the 
court dismissed the domestic violence charge pursuant to a Harvey waiver.65  
Prior to sentencing, a probation officer recommended GPS surveillance, citing 
concern for B.H.’s safety, Holiday’s “despondent” mental state, and the fact 
that Holiday’s results on the “Spousal Assault Risk Assessment” placed him 
in the high-risk group.66  At the sentencing hearing, the court granted 
probation and issued a domestic violence criminal protective order.67  
Moreover, the court had required that Holiday “[p]articipate in electronic 
monitoring, specifically Global Positioning System (GPS) to monitor [his] 
location if directed by [the probation officer].”68 Despite Holiday’s objection, 
the court imposed the condition, noting this was a domestic violence 
offense.69   
On his appeal, Holiday asserted that the trial court abused its discretion 
and violated Holiday’s “basic” constitutional by requiring GPS monitoring at 
the direction of his probation officer.70  According to Holiday, this GPS 
                                                                                                                                                
attacked B.H. with a two-foot long knife.  Id.  Holiday struck B.H. on the arm, partially 
severing an artery, nerve and tendon.  Id. at *1-*2. 
64
 Id. at *1. 
65
 Id.  See EDWARD A. RUCKER & MARTIN B. OVERLAND, 1 Cal. Crim. Practice: Motions, 
Jury Instr. & Sent. § 9:3 (3d ed.). (“Ordinarily, the court cannot consider facts underlying a 
dismissed count in imposing sentence. A Harvey waiver permits a trial court to consider facts 
underlying dismissed counts in determining the appropriate punishment for the offenses of 
which the defendant was convicted.”).  See generally People v. Harvey, 25 Cal.3d 754 (Cal. 
1979) (representing the origin of the Harvey motion). 
66
 Holiday, 2012 WL 1015787 at *2. 
67
 This order prohibited Holiday from contact with B.H. or her boyfriend and also forbade 
Holiday from being within 100 feet of B.H. or her boyfriend.  Id. 
68
 Id. (emphasis added). 
69
 Id. at *2.  During the sentencing hearing, the judge stated that he was going to impose the 
GPS condition because “[t]his is a domestic violence offense.  There’s a stay-away order that 
the defendant not have contact, direct or indirect, nor come within one hundred yards of the 
protected persons’ home, or person, or car.  The GPS device might serve as evidence if he 
does violate.”  Id.  
70
 Id.  Holiday failed to articulate which “basic” constitutional rights were infringed upon. 
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surveillance was “not reasonably related to the [assault conviction] nor 
designed to serve any other purpose.”71 
The appellate court, however, affirmed that the trial court properly 
exercised its discretion in imposing probation with GPS surveillance for 
several reasons.72 California law will generally sustain a probation condition 
unless it is 1) unrelated to the crime the abuser committed, 2) unrelated to 
conduct that is actually illegal, and 3) prohibitive of conduct that is not 
reasonably related to “future criminality.”73 First, the court reasoned, GPS 
monitoring related to Holiday’s confessed crime – domestic violence.74  
Though the court had dismissed the domestic violence charge pursuant to a 
Harvey waiver, it could still consider the charge in imposing probation 
conditions.75 In regards to the second factor, the court noted that the GPS 
condition was reasonable, because Holiday would only have to wear a GPS 
device unless directed to do so by his probation officer in response to 
threatening behavior.76  It would only bar him from criminal activities.77 
Lastly, and most notably, the court reasoned that “the GPS condition serve[d] 
as a deterrent to future criminal conduct” by informing the police of his 
whereabouts and would also likely dissuade Holiday from violating the 
protective order in the future.78   
Almost six years prior to reaching its decision in Holiday, the same 
appellate court decided People v. Randolph.79  In this case, defendant Randy 
Randolph pled guilty to corporal injury to a spouse.80  The trial court placed 
                                                        
71
 Id. at *1. 
72
 Id. at *3. 
73
 Id. at (citing People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 
74
 Id. 
75
 Id. 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. 
79
 People v. Randolph, 2006 WL 2949314 (Cal. App. 2006). 
80
 Id. at *1.  In 2003, Randy Randolph inflicted facial injuries upon his then-wife, including 
two black eyes.  Id.  Less than a year later, Randolph attacked his girlfriend.  Id.  Specifically, 
he pushed her three times, slammed her up against a wall, and then sat on her and choked her.  
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Randolph on formal probation for a three-year period.81  One condition of 
Randolph’s probation was that that he “submit to continuous 
electronic monitoring by a [GPS] device, or other device as directed by [his] 
probation officer.”82 
On appeal, Randolph argued that the GPS condition was unreasonable 
based upon the facts of his case, constitutionally overbroad, and violative of 
his constitutional rights.83 The appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision 
to impose a GPS surveillance condition.84  Noting that “the crime 
of domestic violence justifies increased surveillance and protection as noted 
by the [California] Legislature,” the court found that the GPS condition 
supported a compelling state interest in preventing future instances of 
domestic violence.85  Moreover, this compelling interest “justified the 
restriction on [Randolph’s] right to associate with whomever he desires and 
his right to privacy.”86  The court determined that the GPS monitoring 
condition was necessary to (1) dissuade Randolph from “concealing future 
criminality” and (2) guarantee that Randolph complied with his probation 
terms.87 Because neither Holiday nor Randolph specifically articulated which 
constitutional provision the state violated when it imposed a GPS probation 
condition, the court could not examine the merits of their arguments.  
Nonetheless, it is apparent that the judiciary supports the use of GPS 
surveillance in the domestic violence context. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Id.  When his girlfriend began to yell for help, Randolph bit her hands and her forearm.  Id.  
Pursuant to Randolph’s plea deal, the state dismissed the charges stemming from his attack 
against his girlfriend.  Id.  
81
 Id. 
82
 Id. 
83
 Id.  Like in Holiday, Randolph failed to articulate the specific constitutional rights violated. 
84
 Id. 
85
 Id. at *4. 
86
 Id. at *5. 
87
 Id.  Notably, the court mentioned the societal impact of domestic violence. 
(“Domestic violence is not only a private harm, but it also affects society as a whole.”). 
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PART III:  EFFECTIVENESS OF GPS MONITORING IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
CASES 
GPS surveillance is an effective tool in domestic violence cases.  In 
June 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice published GPS Monitoring 
Technologies and Domestic Violence: An Evaluation Study.88  Edna Erez, 
Peter R. Ibarra, and Oren M. Gur, faculty in the University of Illinois at 
Chicago Department of Criminology, Law and Justice, authored the study 
along with William D. Bales from the College of Criminology and Criminal 
Justice at Florida State University.89 According to their research, “GPS 
defendants stayed away from the exclusion zones from which they were 
banned, thereby showing that GPS monitoring buttresses the no contact orders 
of the court – at least in regards to physical contact taking place within the 
programmed exclusion zones.”90  Moreover, the study demonstrated that an 
individual subject to GPS monitoring is “significantly less likely to be arrested 
for a subsequent domestic violence crime in the long term.”91 
Victims’ experiences with GPS monitoring further demonstrate its 
importance.92  Many women found that GPS surveillance allowed them to re-
establish a sense of control over their own lives.93  Victims felt safer in their 
own homes and the constant fear with which they were accustomed began to 
dissipate.94  One victim in particular stated, “once [the abuser] was put on the 
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GPS and couldn’t contact me, I felt free.”95  Some victims even preferred GPS 
surveillance for their abusers over serving jail time.96 
Even some of the alleged abusers found GPS monitoring to be 
beneficial.  Most notably, GPS surveillance shielded alleged abusers from 
false accusations.97  They could maintain their current employment, whereas 
serving jail time would have likely resulted in termination.98  In contrast, other 
alleged abusers found the GPS monitoring program to be demanding and 
burdensome.99  Some expressed the concern that GPS was too intrusive and 
resulted in their lives becoming transparent.100 
Despite the benefits of GPS surveillance, the technology does have 
limitations.  GPS monitoring does not ensure physical protection of the 
victim.101  It only warns the victim and law enforcement personnel when the 
alleged abuser is within a restricted location.102  As one alleged abuser noted, 
“If your intent was to go out there and hurt and murder somebody, [GPS] is 
not going to stop you.”103  By the same token, it does not prevent the alleged 
abuser from using a proxy, such as a current girlfriend, friend, or family 
member, to harass or abuse the victim.104  The most glaring limitation to GPS 
monitoring is that it is a temporary answer to what is often a long-term 
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problem.105  Most victims grow accustomed to the sense of protection 
provided by GPS surveillance and revert to their constant state of fear once 
the alleged abuser graduates from monitoring.106  One woman stated that she 
is “back to being totally one hundred percent paranoid” when she leaves her 
home.107   
CONCLUSION 
Like any technology, GPS surveillance is not perfect.  As noted, GPS 
monitoring has limitations: it provides no physical protection; it has no effect 
on a proxy, and it is only a short-term solution.108  However, these 
shortcomings are not limited to GPS surveillance.  For instance, shelter 
residence and incarceration of the abuser are similarly temporary.109 Also, an 
abuser subject to any punishment can still use a proxy to harass the victim.110  
Finally, most notably, abusers can physically harm victims with or without the 
GPS surveillance; thus the argument that GPS surveillance does not protect 
victims is tautological.  
Although GPS monitoring has its flaws, it is a necessary and effective 
tool in protecting victims from “separation assaults.”  The remaining states 
should follow the example of states that have already implemented this 
technology.  Properly drafted statutes can avoid constitutional challenges and 
ensure the safety of domestic violence victims for years to come. 
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